



British Food Journal

The governance of geographical indications: Experiences of practical implementation of selected case studies in Austria, Italy, Greece and Japan
Thanasis Kizos, Ryo Koshaka, Marianne Penker, Cinzia Piatti, Christian Reinhard Vogl, Yuta Uchiyama,

Article information:

To cite this document:

Thanasis Kizos, Ryo Koshaka, Marianne Penker, Cinzia Piatti, Christian Reinhard Vogl, Yuta Uchiyama, (2017) "The governance of geographical indications: Experiences of practical implementation of selected case studies in Austria, Italy, Greece and Japan", British Food Journal, Vol. 119 Issue: 12, pp.2863-2879, <https://doi.org/10.1108/BFJ-01-2017-0037>

Permanent link to this document:

<https://doi.org/10.1108/BFJ-01-2017-0037>

Downloaded on: 24 November 2017, At: 03:40 (PT)

References: this document contains references to 58 other documents.

To copy this document: permissions@emeraldinsight.com

The fulltext of this document has been downloaded 9 times since 2017*

Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by emerald-srm:463687 []

For Authors

If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information.

About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.com

Emerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.

Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation.

*Related content and download information correct at time of download.

The governance of geographical indications

Experiences of practical implementation of selected case studies in Austria, Italy, Greece and Japan

Governance of geographical indications

2863

Received 25 January 2017
Revised 4 April 2017
Accepted 4 April 2017

Thanasis Kizos

Department of Geography, University of the Aegean, Mytilene, Greece

Ryo Koshaka

*Graduate School of Environmental Studies,
Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan*

Marianne Penker

*Department of Economics and Social Sciences,
University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna, Austria*

Cinzia Piatti

University of Hohenheim, Hohenheim, Germany

Christian Reinhard Vogl

University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna, Austria, and

Yuta Uchiyama

*Graduate School of Environmental Studies,
Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan*

Abstract

Purpose – Place-based foodstuffs have gained salience in markets worldwide and geographical indication (GI) products are prominent examples. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the governance (formal and informal institutions) of the European and Japanese GI schemes, discuss the variety of procedures of implementing the features of the governance system (inclusion and exclusion of actors) for six GI cases and reflect on future GI governance.

Design/methodology/approach – The criteria for assessing the six cases were descriptive and analytical and the information and data come from official documents, literature (scientific and “grey”), interviews, observations and personal communications with key-informants of the GI systems. Three of the cases are categorized as “failures” and are included to provide more insights on the diverse dynamics of GI systems.

Findings – Registration of GIs seems to be a process rather than a single step, requesting coordination and consensus and an interplay between internal and external actors. “Success” and “failure” are relative and related to self-governance processes and the openness of the social system of the GI to establish transparency on inclusion and exclusion. GI systems require constant management and re-definition of production quality or geographical boundaries to adapt to market, climate or technological change.

Originality/value – The paper introduces GI systems categorized as “failures” (either products that did not register as GIs in the end or did register but failed to keep the registration) which provides more insights on how to design and manage complex GI systems.

Keywords Japan, Governance, European Union, Inclusion, Geographical indications, Food production systems

Paper type Viewpoint



British Food Journal

Vol. 119 No. 12, 2017

pp. 2863-2879

© Emerald Publishing Limited

0007-070X

DOI 10.1108/BFJ-01-2017-0037

1. Introduction

In an increasingly globalized food market, place-based foodstuffs have gained salience in markets worldwide. Prominent examples of such products are geographical indication (GI) products that aim to link foodstuff with particular areas (Vandecastelaere *et al.*, 2010).

Producers or other actors create these links to address consumer demands for place-based foodstuffs, with support from policy makers in food and agriculture as well as market forces.

For producers, GIs present an opportunity to differentiate their products from the competition with third parties such as producers from other areas and from global players. Consumers often perceive GIs as “better” and of higher quality than no-name, place-less products, which fill the shelves of retailers. GIs also provide symbolic associations with places and notions of “locality,” “authenticity” and “tradition” (Tregear *et al.*, 2007). GIs allow retailers to build niche markets where these foodstuffs can be sold at higher prices and reach consumers, who are willing to pay extra for the foodstuffs’ origin-based reputation (Allaire *et al.*, 2011; Agostino and Trivieri, 2014). There is much debate on the merits and risks of GI systems and how to meet both consumer expectations as well as fair competition in global food markets. Perception of quality and taste are central, along with claims of “authenticity” or “traditionality.” But, legal protection is also sought, due to the possibility of GIs to generate added value (Gangjee, 2012; West, 2013).

For a long time, GIs have been understood mostly as a European concern (Flandrin and Montanari, 1997). A brief account of international regulations on the protection of GIs starts with the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883, the Madrid Agreement (registration of marks, 1891) and the Lisbon Agreement for the protection of appellations of origin in 1958, which was signed by 26 countries (Sylvander and Barham, 2011). With the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, GIs were included in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, which protects GI identified wines (Art. 23) and provides a minimum standard for protecting other food products in national legislations of WTO members (Thevenod-Mottet and Marie-Vivien, 2011). Article 22 defines GIs as “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. In respect of GIs, members shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent: the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical area other than the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the good; any use which constitutes an act of unfair competition within the meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967).” Europe (and especially the EU) has been charged (Firth, 2015) in this context of using GIs to defend some sort of rentier power over its agri-food products (Coombe and Aylwin, 2011) with the core of this complaints lying in the (alleged) claims of some proprietary of its territory and know-how (in other words, the highly contested and poorly understood concept of *terroir*).

Today, GIs have been adopted by both developed and developing countries in different ways, raising discussions on the exact nature of GIs and their power beyond pure market-related issues, including issues related to cultures or local identity (Kohsaka, 2015; Mancini, 2013). Although a common global GI legal system does not exist yet, individual countries (e.g. Japan, Switzerland) or economic regions (European Union, Andean Community) implement specific GI regulatory schemes and acknowledge GI products based on bilateral agreements. On the other hand, countries like the USA, Australia or Sri Lanka, do not see a need to complement their well-introduced trademark schemes with GIs.

Depending on the formal institutions available in the country of origin and/or target market, producers have different options to protect GIs: through specific GI regulations (e.g. *sui generis* GI law, such as the Japanese or EU regulatory GI framework) and trademark laws in the absence of a specific GI law. Whereas trademarks are usually characterized by the “first in time – first in right” principle and the right to transfer and/or sell the right to anyone, wherever located, GIs are not tradable and are only accessible for producers located in the origin region (Giovannucci *et al.*, 2010; Barham, 2003).

GIs, similar to trademarks, are based on the idea of excluding illegitimate users of a product name (Rangnekar, 2011), not only producers from outside the designated area, but also less powerful players or marginal producers within the area, who may not be able to meet quality standards or to access the certification system. As Chen (1996, p. 39) proposes, “the power to exclude is the power of property” and all GIs follow some specific path that leads to inclusion or exclusion of people, places and outcomes well before reaching the final stage of legal protection. One might ask whether producers know: what lies before them when deciding to join their forces and create a GI within a certain production area and product quality; and who will likely have the ability and social network to get to the final stage of recognition to obtain GI benefits.

The way that consensus on the geographical delimitation and the quality standards of GIs is reached, calls upon issues of governance. Governance in its wider form deals with governing and all the matters that such a process involves. The widely cited Stoker (1998, p. 17) proposed that “governance refers to the development of governing styles in which the boundaries between and within the public and private sectors have become blurred. The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government.” The term has been aptly used to signify a shift from processes of governing based on the role of the state as the central body of regulation, to a more decentered set of operations where multiple actors (Jessop, 1995, p. 310) talks of the “conceptual trinity of market-state-civil society” can shape the process. While in the past governing was a pure matter of political economy and analysis of the mechanisms of government within the state, now attention comes from other research fields and is paid to actors and mechanisms beyond the state (Higgins and Lawrence, 2005, p. 2).

In this paper, we follow this last strand and adopt a wide perspective on the mechanisms and relationships that characterize GI governance. We avoid the ambiguous public-private dichotomy (since public is often equated with the state but also with collective action, whereas private can be linked to markets but also to civil society or to activities taking place in private homes) and refer instead to “internal” (here referring to self-governance, (self-) regulation, interactions, etc. within producer groups) and “external” actors of governance on diverse spatial levels (local, regional, national, international). We are inspired by Young (1997), who talks about governance as a matter of public concern, where members of a social group realize that they are interdependent in the attempt to reach a specific goal – which in our case is an agreement over a GI designation. We consider governance as a complex process, involving informal negotiations and collective choice procedures at a local level, which will impinge upon a global and formal institutional level.

This paper focuses on governance and issues of exclusion comparing selected case studies with different historical perspectives and approaches to GI protection. Although exclusion has been acknowledged as a key issue in GI literature (for instance: Anders and Caswell, 2008; Coombe and Aylwin, 2011; Galtier *et al.*, 2013; Mancini, 2013; Rangnekar, 2011), we lack comparative, cross-continental empirical insights across different cases and GI schemes on the governance behind these products and its practical consequences. Consequently, the objectives of this paper are to:

- (1) compare the European and Japanese GI schemes with focus on their governance (formal and informal institutions);
- (2) discuss the variety of procedures of implementing the features of the governance system for six cases with focus on inclusion and exclusion of actors (geographical boundaries and exclusion of producers outside of the designated area, social boundaries and exclusion within the area); and
- (3) reflect on insights for future GI governance in Europe and Japan and derive lessons for GI systems designed or implemented elsewhere.

2. Methods and data

This paper is based on a comparative case study design, a well-established qualitative research method (Simons, 2014). Cases are studied when they are of special interest either by themselves or for their interactions with other cases (Stake, 1995). Case study approaches have been questioned for their use for generating hypotheses and theory building and for a bias toward verification, as well as for the level of knowledge required to summarize a case study (Flyvbjerg, 2006). But, they are the preferred strategy when “how” and “why” questions are posed to address explanatory interrogations with the purpose of producing a first-hand understanding of contemporary phenomena within complex and diverse real-life contexts (Yin, 2009). In food studies, the case study approach has been particularly useful to present real examples of both people (Macbeth and MacClancy, 2004) and businesses (Lyons, 2005). In our approach, we use some cases that can be considered as “typical” in the sense that they represent many similar real-life examples in the field of GIs (the so-called “successful” cases) and “special” cases, as they present some features that make them particularly suitable for studying and reporting. These three cases are considered as “failures” in the sense that the GI in question was either not registered in the end, or registered but not utilized by local producers. These cases provide more insight on the diverse dynamics of GI systems and the practical issues that may support or undermine their “success” than just the presentation of “best practice cases”.

The selected case studies represent: a diverse institutional context (EU countries with long GI traditions such as Italy and Greece, EU countries with a comparative short GI history, such as Austria, and a totally new system such as Japan); registered GIs with shorter and longer durations of the registration process; foodstuffs with varying target markets (local vs international); what we consider as “failed” cases (including one non-registered and two registered but not used GIs) “Failure” here refers to the inability of the internal and external parties to apply the indication effectively: either failure to register from the start or failure to use the acquired registration. It does not reflect market failure for the products. The cases from the EU include two protected designations of origin (PDOs), i.e. products “the production steps of which all take place in the defined geographical area” Reg (EU) No 1151/2012, Art. 5) and two protected geographical indications (PGIs) (where “at least one of the production steps [including processing or preparation] of which take place in the defined geographical area”: Reg (EU) No 1151/2012, Art. 5). From Japan, two cases are included, one successfully registered and one that did not register (the Japanese system refers to GIs only, without distinguishing if all or some steps of production, processing or preparation take place inside the designated area).

The case studies selected are: Mostviertler Birnmost PGI (Mostviertel Perry; a kind of cider made from pears), Parma Ham PDO, Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale di Modena, PDO, Yubari Melon, Tea A (the real name of the product is not used after the request of the parties involved) and Mytilini – Lesvos PGI Olive oil (Table I, Figures 1 and 2).

Our criteria for assessing these cases were:

- Descriptive: the product, the area (size, location, population, agriculture, and socioeconomic development), the actors involved and their roles (producers /processors and other individuals, farmers, cooperatives, associations, etc.), and the volume of production, along with recent changes (not available for Japanese cases).
- Analytical: the history of governance (who initiated, supported, or opposed the registration process); the producers’ motivation for GI registration; conflicts and challenges along the registration process; inclusion strategy (who is in the GI system and who is out and the relevant procedures); implementation and monitoring of the quality criteria (including ecological/social standards).

GI product	Country	Relationship with the area	Designated area (in km ²)	Number of producers	Volume of production (per year)	Governance bodies
Mostviertler Birnmost PGI (Mostviertel Perry)	Austria	Quality and taste considered to be linked to climate, soil, pear variety and expertise of predominantly small farmers. Historical evidence of production since 1240, has contributed to regional identity ("Mostviertel" is translated as "Perry-Quarter")	5,500 km ² (Perry quarter)	250	2 Million l	Association of Fruit Producers (150 members)
Yubari Melon	Japan	Known in Japan for juicy orange flesh, rich aroma, high sugar content and shape characteristics attributed to topography, climate, soil and local cultivation techniques. History dates back to 1950, when Yubari Melon Association launched (Kinoshita, 2012)	1.8 km ²	116	3,400 t	Agricultural cooperative of Yubari
Prosciutto di Parma (Parma Ham) PDO	Italy	Dry-cured raw ham, produced in one-year curing process (for some, three years). Quality considered to be linked to the pig-bred used, fed only with grains, cereals and whey. Production techniques date back to the fourteenth century	Meat from several northern and central Italian regions, processing only in limited area of the province of Parma	160	8,000,000 branded pieces of ham	Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma
Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale di Modena PDO	Italy	Balsamic vinegar, has been produced since the Middle ages from cooked grape-must and obtained through a complex process of production and aging (12 or 25 years)	2,689 km ² (district of Modena in Emilia Romagna region)	250	80,000 trademark bottles (ca. = 20 t)	Consorzio Tutela Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale di Modena
Myrtilini – Lesvos PGI Olive oil (previously Lesvos PGI olive oil)	Greece	Produced on the island of Lesvos (also known through the island's capital Mytilene). Olive cultivation characterized Lesvos' landscape, economy and culture from antiquity (Kizos and Vakoufaris, 2011)	1,460 km ²	Unknown (max 16,000)	Unknown	None
Tea A	Japan	Tea A indicates tea produced in Minami-Kyusyu Town (Kyusyu island). Goal for GI process to unify existing brands and establish quality standards (Minami-Kyushu 2014).	34.5 km ²	787 farmers (114 factories)	11,755 t	Agricultural cooperative of Minami-Satsuma, and Minami-Kyusyu city tea promotion organization

Table I.
Descriptive characteristics of the selected case studies

Figure 1.
Case study locations
in Europe





Figure 2.
Case study
locations in Japan



The information and data needed for our analysis come from: the European Council's database of origin & registration (DOOR: <http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/>), which includes the official documents of all product names for foodstuffs registered in the European Union; available literature for some of these cases (Kizos and Vakoufaris, 2011; Pircher, 2015; Quiñones-Ruiz *et al.*, 2016; Quiñones-Ruiz *et al.*, 2017); "grey" literature for all cases, typically in the language of each country (studies, internal documents from the producer associations, press clippings, websites, etc.); interviews, observations and personal communications with key-informants of the GI systems (for Yubari Melon interview with a key actor in the local agricultural cooperative in Yubari; for Tea A an interview with a key actor in local municipality (employee/staff member) in Minami-Kyushu; for Mytilini – Lesvos PGI Olive oil six interviews with local actors and two with external ones; and for Mostviertel Perry PGI seven interviews with key-actors, four follow up communications and participatory observations); our personal experience and knowledge of the systems and their actors. The data and the information are diverse and not homogenous, since the cases represent a wide variety of food systems with fewer or more actors and longer or shorter histories. The data certainly is not exhaustive, but rich enough for our research objectives (see above). Before presenting the case studies, we provide a brief outline of the implementation of the GI systems in the EU and in Japan, which is vital for contextualizing the cases and the processes discussed.

3. THE GI schemes in the EU and Japan

The GI regulatory framework in the European Union was established in 1992 (EU Council (EC) Regulation No. 2081/92 (1992), replaced by Regulation No. 510/06 (2006), replaced by the current Regulation No. 1151/2012 that incorporated wine in the system) in an effort to harmonize different national GI frameworks, with two categories of GIs: PDO and PGIs. Differences between adopting a PDO or a PGI designation are not always trivial: although geographical limitations in all production and processing steps involved in PDOs may be more difficult to manage, valorization differences between PDOs and PGIs have not been reported (ARETE, 2013). For some PDO products, research indicates that consumers may be willing to pay more for a PDO rather than a non GI product (e.g. Mesias *et al.*, 2010; Garavaglia and Mariani, 2017 for dry-cured ham; De Magistris and Gracia, 2016 for cheese; but not always for olive oil; Krystallis and Ness, 2005; Aprile *et al.*, 2012), although insufficient knowledge of the scheme in general is reported as a constraining factor, especially in Northern Countries of the EU where consumers are less familiar with the scheme (e.g. ARETE, 2013; Vecchio and Annunziata, 2011 for Italy; Krystallis and Ness, 2005 for Greece; Fandos and Flavián, 2006 for a Spanish product). Some of the most "successful" in terms of prices PDO examples are well-established global brands (e.g. Roquefort PDO cheese). Since its introduction in 1992, 679 PDOs and 796 PGIs have been protected (DOOR database, 6 November 2016, excluding wines), making the European schemes the most widespread application of the GI approach (with the exception of wines that are globally regulated in the TRIPS agreement).

Applications for PDOs or PGIs "may only be submitted by groups who work with the products with the name to be registered," although in exceptional cases "a single natural or legal person may be treated as a group" (Article 49). The group is entitled (Article 45) to: ensure that the quality, reputation and authenticity of their products are guaranteed on the market; take action to ensure adequate legal protection; develop information and promotion activities; develop activities related to ensuring compliance of a product with its specification; take action to improve the performance of the scheme; take measures to enhance the value of products and, where necessary, take steps to prevent or counter any measures which are, or risk being, detrimental to the image of those products. Different national food safety legislation and inspection or certification frameworks involve a varying number of actors in each Member State in the production, safety and marketing of PDOs and PGIs.

In comparison, the history of GIs in Japan is relatively young. The GI regulatory framework in Japan was established in June 2014 and entered into force in June 2015. The law formed mainly through the process coordinated by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and focuses on agricultural, forest and fishery related products. Alcoholic beverages such as wine and spirits have a separate legal framework, regulated under the TRIPs treaty. Within the framework for the agricultural, forest and fishery related products, the scheme equivalent to the European PGI was adopted (the applicants de facto registered papers that are equivalent to the PDO but there is no independent category for the stricter standard). In December 2015, six months after the enforcement of the law, seven products were registered. To date (December 2016), 21 items are registered (food, but also tatami mats and raw silk). The most important agri-food product of Japan – rice – is still missing and there are regional imbalances as well that favor more peripheral and/or mountain areas.

4. Comparison of the GI cases

The findings are presented comparatively in Table I (descriptive variables) (analytical for “success”) and (analytical for “failure”). The three cases that were considered to be successfully implemented (Table II) have all been motivated by the protection against fraud and are self-governed by producers’ organizations. Two of the three remaining cases were successfully registered (Lesvos Olive Oil PGI, Mostviertel Perry PGI), but not, or only partly, implemented (Table III). For the other case, Tea A, the process started, but the producers (particularly some big processors who were not involved from the beginning into the GI discussion) finally decided against a GI application (Table III).

5. Discussion

5.1 “Success” and “failure” of GIs

In this paper, we have not only explored “success,” but also “failure” in the establishment and operation of GI food systems. “Success” in a GI system – as defined in this paper – entails the registration of the product as a GI and the use of the GI label by the local producers. Although there may be many drivers for “success,” we have focused on the governance of the respective GI food systems and on issues of inclusion/exclusion inside and outside the designated area.

We compared case studies from an older and developed GI system in the EU with the Japanese ones, where a similar GI system was set up in 2015. The approach is not exhaustive and might be affected by selection bias, but we believe that the comparison of “successful” and “failed” cases within each system and between the systems provides insights on the process and practice of GI food systems and can guide existing and future GI processes. Our cases demonstrate that the categorization of the cases as “successful” and “failure” is relative and related to the creation and establishment of a GI. Registration is not a simple task and does not guarantee that the GI will then be actually used by local producers as demonstrated by the Mostviertler Birnmost PGI or the Lesvos PGI olive oil cases. Nor does the use of the GI label by the local producers guarantee market success and rewards.

5.2 The initiation of the GI system – registration

The initial decision to start the process to obtain a GI was guided by “internal” and “external” actors in the different case studies. The clearest of these cases for which external actors were prominent is that of Lesvos PGI olive oil, which demonstrates how political choices at the national level (the Ministry of Agriculture and Food pushed for the registration of the PGI) can dictate the process at the local level. For the “successful” cases of the Italian products and the Yubari melon, the process involved a complex internal (local) negotiation of multiple parties with a “stake” in the GI. In the Tea A case, the producers and

GI	Motivation for GI protection	Actors	Self-governance	Quality standards	Outcomes
Yubari Melon – GI	To ensure compliance control and protection by government (high costs of taking legal action against fraud) To benefit from overseas trade	Farmers from the agricultural cooperative of Yubari that were organized in the Yubari Melon association	Only members of the cooperative are allowed to cultivate the Yubari king variety and use the GI	Only “Yubari King” variety Quality standards based on existing market regulations for melons and trademark rules Monitoring by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan Quality standards established by consortium based on historical practices Organoleptic analyses for certification Debate on the length of the aging period resolved within the consortium Monitoring in the past by the consortium, now by private certification body The quality standards have been defined by the 1 st consortium based on historical practices Organoleptic analysis for certification Monitoring first by consortium, now by private certification body	Collective trademark in 1993) One of the first Japanese GIs in Japan in 2015 In the first season-opening auction after registration record-high price Increasing number of orders National protection (Denominazione di Origine Controllata, D.O.C) from 1970 EU protection (PDO) 1992 Various GI amendments Recognition in 90 countries worldwide Producers affiliated to the consortium are increasingly also selling ham without PDO label National protection (D.O.C.) 1977 for the ‘Aceto balsamico di Modena’ National protection of ‘Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale di Modena’ 1983 EU protection (PDO) 2000 Some producers lamented bureaucratic pressure and restrictions due to the 100-ml-bottle
Prosciutto di Parma – PDO	To acquire closer control over fraud (many cases of fraud) To raise the added value with exports To cover the need for protection and overseas recognition	Association of producers (called consortium) including producers, pig farms and abattoirs	Although consortium membership is no longer compulsory to produce the PDO, the consortium is still responsible for several tasks (e.g. producer support, promotion, initiation of change or cancellation of GI) The consortium also sets production quotas		
Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale di Modena- PDO	To protect and control the product (in 1967 foundation of the “Consorzio dell’ Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale di Modena”) To differentiate the production process on the basis of traditional methods and GI recognition by the association of producers (due to commercial boom, industrial production and reputation loss)	Association of producers (called consortium) of mainly small family businesses Due to conflicts in 2002, most bigger producers established a second consortium 250 producers certified for PDO, most are also (voluntary) members of one of two consortia	Consortium still responsible for several tasks (e.g. producer support, promotion, initiation of change or cancellation of GI)		

Table II.
Comparison of three successfully implemented GIs

GI	Motivation for GI protection	Actors	Self-governance	Quality standards	Outcomes
Mostviertel Perry – PGI	To acquire protection against misuse of geographical name To have a common and consistent marketing strategy To differentiate from neighboring Upper Austrian Perry	Fruit producers' association and some processors	Board members of the fruit producers' association drove the GI process with limited direct participation from farmers	No new quality standards for perry were set, those defined by national and provincial law remained in place Monitoring poorly implemented (in the application the authority indicated was the Governor of Lower Austria, but after registration a private certification body was required)	GI protection in 2011 GI never used (unwillingness of majority of producers to pay for certification) Majority decision to cancel GI Quality seal for fruit wine introduced based on Austrian wine law in 2016 (cheaper for producers, wine quality seal better known to Austrian consumers than GI label)
Lesvos – Mytilini Olive oil – PGI	Greek government's strategy to register as many products as possible when the EU GI scheme was introduced	PGI registration implemented in the name of the Island's Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (its members are 1 st degree cooperatives)	Limited direct participation of local producers (members of 1st degree cooperatives) No self-governance body of the GI (GI is not governed in practice)	Quality standards below extra virgin olive oil (collection and milling practices, acidity, mixing of oils) Practically everyone can produce it, no monitoring of quality	Top-down government driven PGI registration in 1993 Low demand for the PGI less than 1% of the island's olive oil sold as PGI in 2007
Tea A – GI	To revalorize the product (low price of tea leaves and increasing production costs in recent years) To unify existing brands To protect the geographical name	Farmers and processors	Stricter GI quality standards would have excluded lower-quality tea producers	No consensus on quality standards	Trademark in 2007 No application for a GI Processors and farmers organized in two different organizations had different expectations regarding quality standards (processors were afraid of shrinking their supply)

Table III.
Comparison of three “failed” GIs

processors are organized in two different organizations and could not come up with a common GI strategy. In fact, the re-negotiation with actors that did not support the registration made the whole process collapse. External actors may also be an important part of the registration process: such as in Austria, where the Regional Management Organization Austria and the regional Chambers of Agriculture played an important role in the GI registration process; in Greece and Japan the Ministries for Agriculture are pivotal (in Japan regional branches are also important); and in Italy the regional governments and research organizations have played an important role in facilitating GI registration and implementation.

Our cases confirm that registration seems to be a process rather than a single step, requesting coordination and consensus (Young, 1997). It requires the definition of the product (in theory at least a slightly different product from that of the competitors), the definition of the producers and the rest of the actors, the area, the quality standards and the self-governance context (formal and informal rules on decision making). This process is dynamic, in the sense that definitions and agreements are constantly re-negotiated, as the two Italian cases show, where producers had to adapt governance and monitoring mechanisms and to “defend” their registered product from ones made with “modern” techniques.

5.3 *The construction of “quality”*

The definition of the product and its “quality” (how it is different from the competition) is critical for GI systems. The literature suggests that this is a process (Bingen and Busch, 2006; Busch, 2011), as it can change due to “internal” (i.e. from the producers and/or other actors involved in self-governance) and “external” pressures, but also from international markets. Setting standards is probably the “core” of any GI, as the standardization process defines the peculiarity of a product with which it gets legal protection against counterfeiting. As our case studies show, setting a standard, on which all interested parties agree seems to be the central element for “success”. The examples of the two Italian PDOs is telling: producers of Prosciutto di Parma PDO based “quality” on historical practices, but a critical aspect (the aging period) was later again discussed and resolved through the consortium; similarly, producers of Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale di Modena PDO “defended” their product by setting quality standards based on historical rather than modern methods. Lesvos PGI olive oil serves as the other opposite example: the original process yields products that the market does not consider of value anymore. The lack of internal negotiation processes, as part of self-governance, for the adaptation of quality standards to consumer needs has rendered the GI label as almost useless on the market. The case of Mostviertel Perry PGI is also revealing in the sense that it seemed to be difficult to make quality of the fruit and the final product of different producers uniform and closer to a set of guidelines.

5.4 *Inclusion – exclusion*

GIs are collective rights with established entry barriers (inclusion/exclusion) defined along social and geographical boundaries (Quiñones-Ruiz *et al.*, 2015). GIs have to be accessible by all producers located within the area meeting the quality standards defined in the product specification and thus the definition of these standards (and also of the producers and those with “a stake” in the product) is a process and subject to negotiations (Sonnino, 2013). At the same time, it has been argued (Kizos and Vakoufaris, 2011) that GIs are a “common resource” of the area, which means that they “belong” to the area and not to individual producers. However, individual producers make and sell GI products. This constant interplay between area and producers (as well as between internal and external actors) is what makes the process of inclusion so dynamic. Here again our case studies range from socially very “open” systems, where basically any producer located in the designated area can produce the GI due to loose quality specifications (e.g. Lesvos PGI olive oil or the Japanese tea case), to the more “closed” and strict system of Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale di Modena PDO. The role of self-governance structures and processes is key to establish transparency on inclusion and exclusion (who can enter and how, who has to leave and why). The example of Tea A illustrates this as internal and external actors involved (farmers and processors) decided to abandon the idea of a GI application due to the fear of shrinking supply of tea leaves if quality standards were set; further they could also not agree if and how processors outside of the geographical area would be included in the

GI system. On the contrary, in the case of Yabari mellon, the interplay between internal and external actors was more effective and has so far managed to overcome friction. In the case of Mostviertel Perry PGI, the heterogeneity of Perry producers in terms of quality (some produce very high and others low quality of pears and perry) and the lack of direct involvement of many farmers in the GI registration process, made the majority of farmers to waive what they considered as a costly certification system and continued to market their products via direct on-farm sales. Here, the low quality standards and socially open GI system, has disadvantaged the few high quality producers that will not be able to benefit from the GI on (inter-)national markets.

The geographical boundaries, characterizing each GI system, express the power of place by territorial inclusion. Territorial inclusion or exclusion can make a vital difference, such as higher price margins for producers located within the area compared to producers of equivalent products located outside (Dentoni *et al.*, 2012; Bowen and de Master, 2011). Changes of the geographical delimitation, however, need consensus among the local (internal) producers and formal approval of an application for amendment in the European system (external actors). The case studies show that a sense of belonging to a specific place is fundamental. The acknowledgment of common spatial origin and production cultures, which translate also in context-specific knowledge and skills for local quality food products, emerges as a central element for “success,” which is the ability to recognize whether the area and the final GI goals are in the best interest of the stakeholders (e.g. the Italian cases). The case of Tea A on the contrary marks a “failure” related to the (non) definition of clear geographical boundaries. Sometimes however, the definition of geographical boundaries follows administrative and legal necessities (Vakoufaris and Kizos, 2011).

5.5 Governance

Finally, self-governance of a GI system is probably the most important aspect of its operation and refers to all of its dimensions (in our case studies these bodies can be “consortia” in Italy, “producer organizations – associations” in Japan and Austria or “unions of cooperatives” in Greece) that regulate GI implementation (Torre and Traversac, 2013). The examples of “success” and “failure” indicate that self-governing bodies are pivotal for successful GI registration and implementation. Dentoni *et al.* (2012) highlighted that European GIs are regulated by EU laws whereas in the rest of the world there is a mixed structure of internal and external institutions; therefore, we cannot ascribe differences in the outcomes only to different geolocalization (Lio and Liu, 2008). The Italian cases are particularly revealing, where collaboration between different internal and external (public and private) actors has been highly rewarding for both. This does not mean that there are no internal conflicts, but these seem to be managed in established negotiation arenas that help to overcome friction. Quiñones-Ruiz *et al.* (2016) showed that self-governance of GI systems and associated negotiations and discussions imply considerable time and efforts, which however pay off for effective protection, which is exactly what was not done in the case of Tea A. This effectiveness in governing the GI system involves all the aspects already discussed (participation, negotiations, adaptation, inspection and certification of quality standards, transparency on inclusion/exclusion) and is striking compared to the “failed” cases. In failed cases, when difficulties arose, mechanisms or institutions that could handle these difficulties were not present.

Self-governing bodies can be formal or informal (Fuchs and Glaab, 2011), evident in the democratically ran consortia of our Italian cases, where diverse actors can openly express opinions and negotiate changes. External institutions are of great importance as well (Devaney, 2016), also in terms of encouraging and acknowledging self-governance among producers (Dentoni *et al.*, 2012). The Lesvos-Mytilini PGI olive oil case shows that managing the registration was made particularly difficult due to the absence of supporting

local governance structures. In the same vein, the Austrian case tells how an old and very traditional beverage did not succeed in GI implementation, due to a registration process that did not acknowledge the asymmetries and heterogeneous needs among high and low quality producers. However, the case of Mostviertel Birmmost PGI is ambiguous. Although the majority of producers decided not to implement the PGI in the end, the registration process resulted in a re-definition of goals and an alternative certification strategy. An extreme example of policy related assistance is that of Yubari melon, where the agricultural cooperative farmers' association (the JA) of Yubari collaborated with the local government to support the branding of the product as an official gift which can be given in return for paying a specific donation in the area (*Furosato Nozei* in Japanese).

5.6 Similarities and differences of European Union – Japan GI systems

Differences between Europe and Japan in the GI systems are mainly on the formal level: the Japanese GI system includes handicraft products and does not differentiate between stricter PDOs and less restrictive PGIs. Another difference reflects the longer traditions of protection in many southern EU countries that were transferred in a common legislative framework, whereas in Japan the system is still in its infancy and struggles to gain recognition in markets and producers. But, even after more than 20 years of PDOs and PGIs in the European Union, Kizos (2013) reports that the degree of knowledge of the scheme is not very high among European consumers and most appear to not know PDO and PGI designations, nor informed of what these labels refer to, with major differences among Southern and Northern countries, reflecting the existing differences in the adoption of the scheme. A more striking difference refers to the role of the state and the interplay between “bottom up” and “top down” approaches in implementing GIs as rural development strategy. Even though there is a long tradition of extended state intervention in agriculture and rural development in Europe, the GI system is widely run by internal and privately organized bodies. Our European cases are a mix of bottom-up and top-down practices, with the bottom-up being stronger with the notable exception of the Lesvos PGI olive oil, a fact directly related to its “failure”. In Japan, with an equally long tradition of state intervention in farming, the ministry of agriculture monitors the GI standards and the mix seems to be toward “top-down” rather than “bottom-up,” at least to date, and comparative to the European cases analyzed in this article.

6. Conclusion

How should GIs be implemented and governed? What can we learn from successful and failed examples in Europe and Japan, i.e. two different GI systems implemented in two different political and cultural contexts in the Global North? The first finding that emerges is related to the evolving nature of GI systems. What our cases make clear is that these systems do not “end” with the registration, but in order to ensure “success”, GIs require constant management, possibly involving re-definition of production quality or geographical boundaries to adapt to market, climate or technological change. This collective management is shaped by the blend of internal and external actors involved and it is important to realize the complex dynamics of this heterogeneous social network.

Another critical issue is the interplay between external vs internal processes of decision making. The external policy frameworks, all parts of international trade deals that provide legal protection, and government support are important. Ultimately, however, successful GI registration and implementation does depend on internal collaboration of heterogeneous producers and processors in the GI area, who have to agree on exclusion and quality criteria and how to implement them, which cannot be effectively enforced top-down. Whereas countries with a long GI tradition, such as Italy, have elaborated mechanisms and democratic principles of self-governance in their consortia over several decades already,

other countries, such as Austria, Japan or Greece have less rich traditions of GI related self-governance for horizontal and vertical collaboration among local farmers, processors, traders and other stakeholders. Compared to Europe, the Japanese cases seem to display a stronger role of the state in GI implementation and monitoring. We conclude with inclusion/exclusion. Our cases show that a feeling of “belonging” is very important and actors have to feel welcome inside the GI system from the start, but at the same time be able to exclude and claim collective ownership of the product and its reputation. This may be the difference between “success” and “failure” in setting up and managing a GI system.

Acknowledgements

This research received support through Grant 603447 (Directorate-General for Research and Innovation) (Project HERCULES) from the European Commission (Seventh Framework Program). It was further funded by the JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP26360062; JP16KK0053; JP17K02105; Environment Research and Technology Development Fund [S-15-2(3) Predicting and Assessing Natural Capital and Ecosystem Services (PANCES)] of the Ministry of the Environment, Japan; Research Institute for Humanity and Nature [No. 14200126]; Asahi Group Foundation [A17B-031]; Kurita Water and Environment Foundation [16C003]; Toyota Foundation [D17-N-0107]. The paper was developed at an expert workshop at the United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability, in Tokyo, 8-10 March 2016. The maps have been created by Kalliopi Avaniidou. The authors would like to thank Tobias Plieninger, Claudia Bieling, Shizuka Hashimoto, Chiho Kamiyama, Pia Kieninger, Brian J. Shaw, Giles Bruno Sioen, Yuki Yoshida, Osamu Saito, Katsue Fukamachi, Kaoru Ichikawa, Toru Terada, Makoto Yokohari, and Karl Zimmerer for stimulating discussions. The authors wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for providing useful feedback.

References

- Agostino, M. and Trivieri, F. (2014), “Geographical indication and wine exports. An empirical investigation considering the major European producers”, *Food Policy*, Vol. 46, pp. 22-36.
- Allaire, G., Casabianca, F. and Thevenod-Mottet, E. (2011), “Geographical origin: a complex feature of agro-food products”, in Barham, E. and Sylvander, B. (Eds), *Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition*, CABI, Wallingford, pp. 1-12.
- Anders, S. and Caswell, J.A. (2008), “The benefits and costs of proliferation of geographical labelling for developing countries”, working paper, Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst.
- Aprile, M.C., Caputo, V. and Nayga, R. Jr (2012), “Consumers’ valuation of food quality labels: the case of the European geographic indication and organic farming labels”, *International Journal of Consumer Studies*, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 158-165, doi: 10.1111/j.1470-6431.2011.01092.x.
- ARETE (2013), “External study: ‘Study on assessing the added value of PDO/PGI products’ for the European Commission”, Executive Summary, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/external-studies/added-value-pdo-pgi_el (accessed 08/03/2017).
- Barham, E. (2003), “Translating terroir: the global challenge of French AOC labeling”, *Journal of Rural Studies*, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 127-138.
- Bingen, J. and Busch, L. (2006), *Agricultural Standards. The Shape of the Global Food and Fiber System*, Springer, Dordrecht.
- Bowen, S. and de Master, K. (2011), “New rural livelihoods or museums of production? Quality food initiatives in practice”, *Journal of Rural Studies*, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 73-82.
- Busch, L. (2011), *Standards: Recipes for Reality*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London.

- Chen, J.M. (1996), "A sober second look at appellations of origin: how the United States will crash France's wine and cheese party", *Minnesota Journal of Global Trade*, Vol. 5, pp. 29-64.
- Coombe, R.J. and Aylwin, N. (2011), "Bordering diversity and desire: using intellectual property to mark place-based products", *Environment and Planning A*, Vol. 43 No. 9, pp. 2027-2042.
- De Magistris, T. and Gracia, A. (2016), "Consumers' willingness to pay for light, organic and PDO cheese", *British Food Journal*, Vol. 118 No. 3, pp. 560-571, doi: 10.1108/BFJ-09-2015-0322.
- Dentoni, D., Menozzi, D. and Capelli, M.G. (2012), "Group heterogeneity and cooperation on the geographical indication regulation: the case of the 'Prosciutto di Parma' consortium", *Food Policy*, Vol. 37 No. 3, pp. 207-216.
- Devaney, L. (2016), "Good governance? Perceptions of accountability, transparency and effectiveness in Irish food risk governance", *Food Policy*, Vol. 62, pp. 1-10, available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.04.003>
- Fandos, C. and Flavián, C. (2006), "Intrinsic and extrinsic quality attributes, loyalty and buying intention: an analysis for a PDO product", *British Food Journal*, Vol. 108 No. 8, pp. 646-662, available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00070700610682337>
- Firth, A. (2015), "European norms in transit: trade mark norms, TTIP uncertainties and the relevance of TPP", *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 323-330.
- Flandrin, J. and Montanari, M. (1997), *Storia dell'alimentazione*, Bari, Laterza.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2006), "Five misunderstandings about case-study research", *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 219-245, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363>.
- Fuchs, D. and Glaab, K. (2011), "Material power and normative conflict in global and local agrifood governance: the lessons of 'Golden Rice' in India", *Food Policy*, Vol. 36 No. 6, pp. 729-735, available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2011.07.013>
- Galtier, F., Belletti, G. and Maressotti, A. (2013), "Factors constraining building effective and fair geographical indications for coffee: insights from a Dominican case study", *Development Policy Review*, Vol. 31 No. 5, pp. 597-615.
- Gangjee, D. (2012), *Relocating the Law of Geographical Indications*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Garavaglia, C. and Mariani, P. (2017), "How much do consumers value protected designation of origin certifications? estimates of willingness to pay for PDO dry-cured ham in Italy", *Agribusiness*, Vol. 33 No. 3, pp. 403-423, doi: 10.1002/agr.21494.
- Giovannucci, D., Barham, E. and Pirog, R. (2010), "Defining and marketing 'Local' foods: geographical indications for US products", *The Journal of World Intellectual Property*, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 94-120.
- Higgins, V. and Lawrence, G. (2005), "Virtual Governance: globalization and the new politics of regulation", in Higgins, V. and Lawrence, G. (Eds), *Agricultural Governance. Globalization and the New Politics of Regulation*, Routledge, Oxon.
- Jessop, B. (1995), "The regulation approach, governance and post-Fordism: alternative perspectives on economic and political change?", *Economy and Society*, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 307-333.
- Kinoshita, M. (2012), Introduction of production area of Yubari Melon, Yasai Zyohou, Agriculture & Livestock Industries Corporation, Independent Administrative Agency (In Japanese), available at: <http://vegetable.alic.go.jp/yasaijoho/santi/1208/santi1.html> (accessed November 30, 2016).
- Kizos, T. (2013), "Consumers' and producers' expectations and gains from geographical indications: towards a conceptual context", in de la Guardia, M. and Gonzalez, A. (Eds), *Food Protected Designation of Origin Methodologies and Applications, Comprehensive Analytical Chemistry*, Vol. 60, Elsevier, pp. 31-47, available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-59562-1.00002-5>
- Kizos, T. and Vakoufaris, H. (2011), "Valorisation of a local asset: the case of olive oil on Lesvos Island, Greece", *Food Policy*, Vol. 36 No. 5, pp. 704-713, available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2011.06.005>
- Kohsaka, R. (Ed.) (2015), *Local Brand Strategy in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery: Revitalizations using Geographical Indication*, GYOSEI Corporation, Tokyo.

- Krystallis, A. and Ness, M. (2005), "Consumer preferences for quality foods from a South European perspective: a conjoint analysis implementation on Greek olive oil", *The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review*, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 62-90.
- Lio, M. and Liu, M.-C. (2008), "Governance and agricultural productivity: a cross-national analysis", *Food Policy*, Vol. 33 No. 6, pp. 504-512, available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2008.06.003>
- Lyons, H. (2005), "Food industry case studies: a suitable medium for publication", *British Food Journal*, Vol. 107 No. 9, pp. 702-713, available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00070700510615080>
- Macbeth, H. and MacClancy, J. (2004), *Researching Food Habits: Methods and Problems*, Berghahn Books, Oxford, NY.
- Mancini, M.C. (2013), "Geographical indications in Latin America value chains: a "branding from below" strategy or a mechanism excluding the poorest?", *Journal of Rural Studies*, Vol. 32, pp. 295-306, doi: 10.1016/j.jrurstud.2013.07.008.
- Mesias, F.J., Escribano, M. and Gaspar, P. (2010), "The role of protected designation of origin in consumer preference for iberian dry-cured ham in Spain", *Italian Journal of Food Science*, Vol. 4 No. 22, pp. 367-376.
- Minami-Kyushu (2014), First Minami Kyusyu Overall Plan (In Japanese). available at: www.city.minamikyushu.lg.jp/contents/file/20140820110632.pdf (accessed November 30, 2016).
- Pircher, M. (2015), "Transaktionsaufwand, – nutzen & – risiken kollektiven Handelns am Fallbeispiel 'Mostviertler Birmmost g.g.A.'", master thesis, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna, available at: https://zidapps.boku.ac.at/abstracts/download.php?dataset_id=12043&property_id=107 (accessed October 25, 2017).
- Quiñones-Ruiz, X.F., Penker, X., Vogl, C.R. and Samper-Gartner, L.F. (2015), "Can origin labels re-shape relationships along international supply chains? – the case of Café de Colombia", *International Journal of the Commons*, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 416-439.
- Quiñones-Ruiz, X.F., Penker, M., Belletti, G., Marescotti, A. and Scaramuzzi, S. (2017), "Why early collective action pays off: evidence from protected geographical indications", *Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems*, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 179-192.
- Quiñones-Ruiz, X.F., Penker, M., Belletti, G., Marescotti, A., Scaramuzzi, S., Barzini, E., Pircher, M., Leitgeb, F. and Samper-Gartner, L.F. (2016), "Insights into the black box of collective efforts for the registration of geographical indications", *Land Use Policy*, Vol. 57, pp. 103-116.
- Rangnekar, D. (2011), "Remaking place: the social construction of a geographical indication for Feni", *Environment and Planning A*, Vol. 43 No. 9, pp. 2043-2059.
- Simons, H. (2014), "Case study research: in-depth understanding in context", in Leavey, P. (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research*, OUP, Oxford, pp. 455-470.
- Sonnino, R. (2013), "Local foodscapes: place and power in the agri-food system", *Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica, Section B – Soil & Plant Science*, Vol. 63 No. S1.
- Stake, R.E. (1995), *The Art of Case Study Research*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
- Stoker, G. (1998), "Governance as theory: five propositions", *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 50 No. 155, pp. 27-28.
- Sylvander, B. and Barham, E. (2011), "Introduction", in Barham, E. and Sylvander, B. (Eds.), *Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition*, CABI, Wallingford.
- Thevenod-Mottet, E. and Marie-Vivien, D. (2011), "Legal debates surrounding geographical indications", in Barham, E. and Sylvander, B. (Eds.), *Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition*, CABI, Wallingford, pp. 13-28.
- Torre, A. and Traversac, J.-B. (2013), *Territorial Governance. Local Development, Rural Areas and Agrofood Systems*, Springer Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg.
- Tregear, A., Arfini, F., Belletti, G. and Marescotti, A. (2007), "Regional foods and rural development: the role of product qualification", *Journal of Rural Studies*, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 12-22, available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2006.09.010>

-
- Vakoufaris, H. and Kizos, T. (2011), "Alternative agri-food geographies? Geographic indications in Greece", *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, Vol. 102 No. 2, pp. 220-235.
- Vandecastelaere, E., Arfini, F., Belletti, G. and Marescotti, A. (2010), *Linking People, Places and Products: A Guide for Promoting Quality Linked to Geographical Origin and Sustainable Geographical Indications*, 2nd ed., FAO, Rome, available at: www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/debde43-9d99-5c74-a440-e8db347941ac/ (accessed March 8, 2017).
- Vecchio, R. and Annunziata, A. (2011), "The role of PDO/PGI labelling in Italian consumers' food choices", *Agricultural Economics Review*, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 80-98.
- West, H.G. (2013), "Appellations and indications of origin, terroir, and the social construction and contestation of place-named foods", in Murcott, A., Belasco, W. and Jackson, P. (Eds.), *The Handbook of Food Research*, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, pp. 209-228.
- Yin, R.K. (2009), *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Vol. 5, Sage Publications, Los Angeles, CA.
- Young, O.R. (1997), "Rights, rules, and resources in world affairs", in Young, O.R. (Ed.), *Global Governance. Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience.*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London, pp. 1-27.

Further reading

- Balsamico (2016), "Information about Aceto Balsamico", available at: www.balsamico.it (accessed July 10, 2016).
- Balsamico Tradizionale (2016), "Information about Aceto Balsamico". available at: www.balsamicotradizionale.it (accessed July 14, 2016).
- Prosciutto di Parma (2016), "Information about Parma Ham", available at: <http://www.prosciuttodiparma.com> (accessed July 28, 2016).

Corresponding author

Thanasis Kizos can be contacted at: akizos@aegean.gr